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Interdisciplinary Challenge in Sociological Theory
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1. INTRODUCTION: FORMALISM VERSUS BEHAVIORAL-REALISM: 
SECURING THE DISTINCTION
 
A commonplace theme in sociological theory circles revolves around the issue of
whether the perennially elusive micro/macro link or the still befuddling agency/
structure problematic are the most central issues in contemporary sociology (on
the ﬁrst issue see the papers collected in Alexander, Giesen, Münch, and Smelser
1987; White 1997 and also Lawler, Ridgeway, and Markovsky 1993 on the second
see Giddens 1979, 1984; Sewell 1992). In this paper I identify and highlight the
importance of another major theoretical divide which while not having received
the same amount of attention as these two may in the end carry more importance
for the future development of sociological theory. This issue can be thought of—
at the risk of some oversimpliﬁcation—as the emergence and consolidations of
two antithetical 
 
styles of production
 
 of general sociological theory. This can also be
seen as the appearance of two “intellectual strategies” in the sense of Camic
(1987: 424) and Bates and Peacock (1989: 567), which have been used by some
theorists to attempt reorient and unify the ﬁeld according to their preferred
parameters. What is the best way to characterize these two intellectual strategies?
1.1 Formalism
On the one side, stands the pull toward the development of a “pure” (Black 1979,
1995, 2000a, 2000b) or “relational” sociology (Emirbayer 1997), one that with the
aid of mathematical formalization and parameterization (Fararo 1989a, 1997;
Fararo 1989b; White 2000) will develop a species of social-scientiﬁc discourse that
will ﬁnally dispense with the need to refer to “pre-scientiﬁc” and “non-sociological”
entities such as motives (Berkowitz 1988), attitudes (Wellman 1988), the person
(White 1992) or even individuals (Mayhew 1980, 1981). The move towards
formalization is driven by the goal of ﬁnally realizing the Comtean project of an 
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intellectually independent science of society. This time the autonomy of sociology
will be achieved through the development of formal models of 
 
strictly sociological
 
processes. This new sociology will not require any sort of reliance on the conceptual
baggage and ontological assumptions of other sciences especially psychology and
biology.
Whenever theorists deploy this intellectual strategy they tend to evince a
preoccupation with 
 
mathematical formalization
 
 and 
 
abstract
 
 theory building. The
primitive entities that are considered to be the building blocks of social structure
are not necessarily concrete but are usually processes, “relations”, or unobservable
macro-structural tendencies of social systems such as homophily (Bates and
Peacock 1989; Fararo and Skvoretz 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook
2001) or socially constructed categorical and graduated distinctions (Blau 1977a;
McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991). The more recent versions of this form of
general theory building strategy differ from classic predecessors (e.g. Coleman
1990; Homans 1950; Parsons 1937), in that the 
 
social actor
 
 is abandoned as a both
a useful unit of analysis and a basic component constitutive of larger processes.
This is what I would refer to from now on as 
 
formalism
 
 (Blaug 1999, 2003; Lemert
1979: 931).
 
1
 
1.2 Behavioral-Realism
On the other hand, it is possible to observe the gradual development of an
alternative (and in many ways antithetical to formalism as we will see below)
intellectual strategy whose distinctive quality is an equally strong push toward
conceptual and empirical integration with those very same disciplines that from
the formalist viewpoint are perceived as compromising the integrity of sociology.
This path involves relinquishing the very idea of sociology as an autonomous
conceptual ediﬁce composed of abstract models of 
 
exclusively social
 
 processes. Here
concepts and mechanisms derived from biology (Ellis 1996; Smith and Stevens
2002; Udry 1995) or psychology and cognitive science and psychology (Carley 1989;
Dimaggio 1997, 2002; Thoits 1995), are considered to be equally important.
From this perspective sociology is still seen as the central integrative intellectual
hub where all of these strands meet (Gove 1995). However, basic themes that have
been historically central in social theory such as the dynamics of micro-interaction
(Kemper and Collins 1990; Turner 1988, 2000b, 2002), emotions (Kemper 1981;
Turner 1999, 2000a) or the general motivational factors that govern social behavior
(Gove 1994; Turner 1987) are considered impossible to explain without recourse
to the theoretical and empirical storehouse of neurophysiology (Hammond 2003;
Lizardo 2007; Smith and Stevens 1996, 2002; Turner 2000a), cognitive psychology
and linguistics (Bergesen 2004a, 2004b), and evolutionary psychology, neuroendo-
crinology, and behavioral genetics (Ellis 1996; Gove 1994; Smith and Stevens
1996, 2002; Udry 2000).
 
2
 
 All sciences traditionally thought of as exclusively dealing 
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with non-social or infraindividual processes. The processes that are conceived as
the ontological “building blocks” of the social (e.g. relations) are from this point
of view seen as 
 
generated
 
 from a more fundamental bio-psychological substrate.
I will refer to this last type of general explanatory attempt as 
 
behavioral-realism
 
.
 
3
 
Like formalists, behavioral-realists are concerned with arriving at universal
explanatory frameworks of human behavior. In that sense this style of theorizing
shares the same ambitions toward generality and comprehensiveness as its formal-
ist counterpart but generalizations are made about concrete 
 
biophysical
 
 individuals
engaged in—potentially—observable interaction in real-life 
 
socioecological
 
 settings
(e.g. Collins 1981; Turner 2000b).
 
4
 
 From the behavioral-realist viewpoint the
formalist tendency to conceive of the social agent as a stylized, disembodied
abstraction constitutes a limitation rather than an advantage.
Freese et al. (2003: 244) provide an apt illustration of the behavioral-realist
orientation as contrasted with a formalist point of view on the actor:
 
If one accepts that human beings are material entities all the way through, then all our thoughts
and actions are embodied, imply thoroughly physical processes, and are “biological” activities in
the sense of being part of our ongoing constitution as organisms. 
 
Even so, the various idioms with
which social scientists typically consider behavior rarely require explicit reference to the materiality of human actors;
that is, humans can be disembodied abstractions in the language of theory, even if unrelentingly embodied in actual
practice
 
. Proximate physiological mechanisms and processes are thus effectively treated as a black
box in much social scientiﬁc thinking, but another way of asserting the relevance of “biology” is
to assert the necessity or value of opening this black box and extracting information about the
physical workings of our bodies and minds (italics added).
 
In contrast to the implicit (and sometimes explicit) mono-disciplinary stance
evinced by formalists, behavioral-realists are of primary 
 
interdisciplinary
 
 bent, pro-
posing a merging of research programs and theoretical orientations that cuts across
disciplines as exempliﬁed by such “hybrid” proposals for a “biopsychosociology”
(Gove 1994), “evolutionary sociology” (Maryanski 1998), “biosociology” (Ellis 1996),
“cognitive sociology” (DiMaggio 2002) or even “neurosociology” (Smith and
Stevens 2002). This mode of theoretical integration is not necessarily averse to
mathematization or formalization (e.g. Carley 1989, 1991; Sun 2004), but mathe-
matical models are always subordinate to considerations and constraints related
to some set of basic processes, entities and mechanisms borrowed from some more
fundamental “lower level” discipline. This attitude of integration and transdis-
ciplinary borrowing of concepts and “mechanisms” stands in sharp contrast to the
formalist attempt to defend the “purity” of sociology (Black 2000a, 2000b) and
its potential theoretical and empirical autonomy from other disciplines (McPherson
2004). This is done mainly by resorting to mathematical and logical schemes that
abstract the “social” from its embeddedness in biophysical reality.
In comparison to the many attempts at formalist uniﬁcation that have taken
place in sociology since the middle of last century (e.g. Parsons, Luhmann, Coleman),
behavioral realist pleas are both a relatively new entry into the disciplinary contest 
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of how models of society and social structure should be properly formulated.
However, they have become increasingly more frequent and programmatic of
late. While both formalists and behavioral-realists share almost identical diagnoses
of the state of the discipline pointing to its fragmentation and lack of core consensus,
behavioral-realists offer a radically different remedy that pure mathematics and
formal theoretical language. They look beyond the disciplinary boundaries of
sociology and attempt to borrow conceptual tools from other disciplines such as
biology and psychology with the hope of providing social theory with a much
needed set of core of fundamental concepts and basic mechanisms. In this way
they aim to remedy what is perceived as the unsatisfactory multi-paradigmatic
status of sociology.
Both formalist and behavioral-realist theoretical strategies emerge as a response
to the perennial state of disintegration that has come to characterize current
sociological inquiry (Stinchcombe 1994; Turner and Kim 1999). Further, those
who deploy each strategy usually claim to possess the remedy to this malady:
 
theoretical uniﬁcation
 
 (Black 2000a, 2000b; Fararo 1997; Gintis 2007; Gove 1995).
However, while sharing the same goal, 
 
the means
 
 to theoretical uniﬁcation become
radically different depending on whether the formalist or behavioral-realist route
is chosen. Both formalist and behavioral-realists seek generalization and the
development of explanatory theory in sociology.
Formalism attempts to 
 
reduce
 
 the ontological (and therefore empirical) content
of the discipline to a minimum by outlawing or radically limiting reference to any
sort of intrapsychic and/or intra-organismic motivational factor (Mayhew 1980,
1981). Formalists consider individual level factors as simply an epiphenomenon
that can be “reduced” to pure structuralist processes (see for example Burt 1992:
251, on personality; Popielarz and McPherson 1995 on choice homophily; White
1992 on the notion of “the person”). Network theory in pursuing its “anti-categorical”
imperative (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994) is the most recent attempt to realize
this sort of 
 
top-down reduction
 
 (DiTomaso 1982). Randall Collins’ early call for a
“microtranslation” of all macrosociology into behavioral-realist microsociological
language, in which allusions to such reiﬁed entities as the state, institutions and
organizations are replaced with reference to “real” empirical individuals and
individual-level microprocesses such as emotional energy and interaction rituals
is the 
 
bottom-up
 
 behavioral-realist obverse of the formalist attempt at reduction.
 
5
 
1.3 Cognition versus Biology
Behavioral-realists can be partitioned into two primary groups: on the one hand
there are those who look toward 
 
biology
 
. On the other hand, some behavioral-
realists prefer concepts that originate in the 
 
cognitive sciences
 
. Randall Collins (1994)
for example, has concluded that the only way that sociology may become a “rapid
discovery” science is to integrate traditional socio-cognitive and micro-interactionist 
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research programs with investigations from artiﬁcial intelligence (see also Bainbridge,
Brent, Carley, Heise, Macy, Markovsky, and Skvoretz 1994 on the potential for a
productive relationship between sociology and artiﬁcial intelligence). I propose that
this represents a dramatic change in attitudes towards both psychology and biology
on the part of mainstream sociology given the history of their initial differentiation
in the 19th century academic ﬁeld (Camic 1986; Camic and Xie 1994).
 
6
 
In addition, behavioral realist-oriented researchers have begun to make inroads
into traditional formalist ground. They have begun to offer arguments that claim
to either solve or provide a superior account of theoretical problems and unre-
solved issues that have previously been the purview of formalist theories in par-
ticular network theory. This is a direct challenge to the ambitions of the “strong
formalist program” of structuralist theory (Mayhew 1980, 1981) and network
theory (Berkowitz 1982, Burt 1982) to explain social processes without references
to individual level biophysical attributes (Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 2001).
 
7
 
 Other
behavioral-realist-inclined researchers have turned to primatology and evolutionary
biology in order to study processes of societal evolution and stratiﬁcation (Maryanski
and Turner 1992) a topic of traditional concern to formalist theorists (e.g. Mayhew
and Levinger 1976a; Mayhew and Schollaert 1980; McPherson and Ranger-
Moore 1991; Skvoretz and Mayhew 1988).
Behavioral-realists who draw on biology, evolutionary psychology or sociobiology
may seem more radical or controversial—and may be regarded as a qualitatively
different group—than the “softer” behavioral-realists that look toward the cognitive
sciences. However, it is important to keep in mind that this impression may simply
be due to the historically combative—and politically sensitive—relationship between
biology and sociology and not with any inherent difference between the underlying
strategies of these two behavioral-realist subgroups. There might also not be any
major 
 
theoretical
 
 incompatibility. In this respect it is important to note that the
dominant version of biological behavioral-realism currently extant (evolutionary
psychology) is nothing more than a cognitive model of the human agent (Carley
1989; Carley and Newell 1994) informed by Darwinian reasoning. Evolutionary
psychology relies on a “massively modular” model of cognition, complete with
information-processing, attentional and motivational/emotional biases produced
by common selection pressures in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness
(Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992; Buller 2005; Buss 1995).
In spite of the various substantive differences between these lines of inquiry, the
key point to keep in mind here is that the common behavioral-realist turn to other
disciplines is motivated by what are generally perceived as failures to achieve
cognitive consensus within sociology (Ellis 1996). This is indirectly an indictment—
or at least an implicit recognition of failure—of early formalist paradigms (Black
1979; Blau 1977b; Mayhew 1981) that promised a reconﬁguration and uniﬁcation
of the ﬁeld under the banner of the study of “pure” sociological processes and the
prohibition of reference to intra-psychic processes or attribute-based explanations
(Black 2000b; Mayhew 1981; Mayhew and Schollaert 1980). 
44
 
Omar Lizardo
 
© 2009 The Author
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009
 
2. ON REALISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
 
2.1 Social Theory versus Sociological Theory
Before proceeding any further, a note on the conception of “sociological theory”
that I will use in the rest of the paper is in order. This will serve to forestall any
confusion as to the intent and scope of the argument that follows. First, I abide
by an analytical distinction between “sociological theory” (e.g. Merton 1968;
Parsons 1937) and “social theory” (e.g. Pels 2001). While the term “social theory”
is a much more complex, loosely bounded, inter-disciplinary and wide-ranging
(both in terms of time and geographically circumscribed traditions of thought)
body of discourse, I conceive of “sociological theory”—following the work of Fararo
(1989b) as involving a much narrower set of concerns and as being composed of
a much stricter set of 
 
disciplinary
 
 lines of thinking speciﬁc to the sociological
tradition. The speciﬁc intellectual boundaries of this theoretical tradition have
been historically shaped primarily how the discipline of 
 
sociology
 
 was initially
deﬁned in the 
 
American
 
 academy (Camic 1987; Camic and Xie 1994) and how it
has evolved through time (Alexander 1987).
In this respect, the present analysis is centered on a set of speciﬁc theoretical
problems that have pervaded—and I argue continue to affect—theory construction
and concept formation in 
 
American
 
 sociology. It is beyond the scope of this paper
(and beyond my knowledge and abilities) to address either social theory broadly
deﬁned, and to address theoretical concerns outside of the American sociological
ﬁeld. It is therefore possible that a lot of the arguments that I make below simply
do not apply to traditions of sociological theorizing outside of the United States
(e.g. British or French Sociology).
Furthermore, even within the realm of American “sociological theory” in this
paper, will be talking about social theory in exclusively in its 
 
general explanatory
 
variant. I once again follow Fararo (1989a) here, who has proposed a useful
classiﬁcation scheme that distinguishes two other facets of sociological (and social)
theory: 
 
normative
 
 (also known as critical theory) and 
 
world historical
 
. The arguments
that follow are meant to apply exclusively to the ﬁrst type. These two restrictions
mean that there will be a host of thinkers and theorists that will necessarily be left
out of my account. For instance, when speaking of “network theory” below, I will
restrict my discussion to 
 
American
 
 network theory (for a good sociological history
of this line of thinking see Freeman 2004). I will not address broad “social theory”
thinkers that use the term network as a loose, non-explanatory metaphor to
characterize broad trends in modern society in a world-historical style of theorizing
(e.g. Urry, Castells).
Finally, because this paper is concerned with a very speciﬁc and restricted
notion of realism (as noted above) and not with the usual debate concerning the
role of epistemological realism in social science, I will not deal with the relationship
between my argument and the now burgeoning ﬁeld of meta-theory and philosophy 
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of social science known as “critical realism” (CR) (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1998).
While this is an important omission, I believe that the argument offered above
concerns matters that have not been adequately discussed within the constraints
posed by this approach (but which are not necessarily irrelevant or disconnected
from some of the issues raised by proponents and critics of CR). I leave for future
consideration a more detailed treatment of the relationship of how the issues
raised in this paper would be considered from a critical realist point of view.
2.2 Which Realism?
In what speciﬁc sense then are behavioral realists “realist”, and formalists
“irrealists”? As we will see below above and beyond the usually considered issue
of epistemic realism, behavioral realism is instead concerned with a relationship
of ﬁt or 
 
verisimilitude
 
 between 
 
empirical reality
 
 and the 
 
models constructed to explain that
reality
 
 (Maki 2002; Niniluoto 2002). In this sense, the “realism” in behavioral
realism is an attribute of 
 
models
 
 and 
 
explanatory schemes
 
—especially at the levels of
axioms, postulates and assumptions—not an attribute of world “out-there.”
Here I follow Rabin (2002: 661) in deﬁning (behavioral) realism as “. . . trueness
to the [relevant] behavioral and [neuro/bio/cognitive] psychological reality” and
Maki (2002: 90) in noting that in the social sciences (like economics) in contrast
to more abstract philosophical discussions, the key issue is “
 
realisticness
 
 [sic] 
 
as a
property of theories
 
” (italics in the original). An important point to note is that in this
context the realism of “behavioral realism” is not the same as the 
 
epistemological
 
notion of “realism” as the term is used in the philosophy of science (e.g. Hacking
1983). This distinction is important, since most sociological formalists, especially
those that draw from the Durkheimian (as opposed to the Simmelian) lines of
formalism are realists in an epistemological sense. That is, they believe that there
exist “real” (insofar as they are independent from human perception and cognition)
supraindividual structures that serve to shape and constrain individual choice and
action.
A behavioral-realist stance—because of its insistence on 
 
actually existing
 
 mechan-
isms and operations at multiple levels of analysis—also necessarily implies a form
of epistemological realism. That is, the entities and processes alluded to in a given
theory’s assumption set has to have some extension in the world (although some
may be unobservable given the contemporary state of investigative technologies),
and not be convenient mathematical ﬁctions endowed with a purely semantic
(intensional) or purely logical status. While the fact that some formalists make an
ontological commitment to an obdurate—“intransitive” in Bhaskar’s (1998: 9–11)
terms—reality independent of the experience of social agents would seem to
imply that they also have to abide by a behavioral realist criteria of verisimilitude,
they “save” themselves from this predicament by postulating that this intransitive
reality is 
 
inherently
 
 (as opposed to incidentally) unobservable or abstract (usually by 
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relying on a “process” ontology), thus allowing their formal-theoretical represen-
tations of that reality to not be constrained by feedback from the external world,
and only be constrained by the theorist’s imagination and the mathematical
object’s representational capacity. In this sense, the realism of the formalist
remains “transcendental” while that of the behavioral-realist is “empirical.”
2.3 Formalism and the Micro/Macro Divide
It is important to note that formalist theorizing, while primarily espoused by those
who reject the individual or the person as a proper unit of analysis or as a pre-
scientiﬁc ﬁction 
 
cannot
 
 be equated with the holist side of the holism/individualism
debate. Mathematically oriented methodological individualists such as Coleman
or Homans can be considered as having made used of a formalist strategy no less
than “pure” structuralists that enshrine exclusively relational or macrolevel pro-
cesses as the proper object of social analysis. This is because the model of the
individual that microlevel formalists uphold is nothing but a mathematically
expedient ﬁction not expected to conform to real persons (White 1997). Both
methodological individualists and “relational” theorists are equally prone to reject
behavioral realism and the theoretical integrity of natural persons and 
 
thus can be
classiﬁed as deploying the same mode of theorizing
 
 (in a broad, but useful sense), in spite
of the “anti-individualist” rhetoric that can sometimes emanate from the formalist
group (Mayhew 1981). None other than Harrison White (1997: 61–62)—an analyst
sometimes criticized for his anti-individualism and “reductive” formalism (Brint
1992)—has detected this seldom acknowledged commonality between the strong
structuralists and formal methodological individualists in their common denial of
behavioral realism as a desirable property of socio-theoretical discourse:
 
I think there is a hidden reason for the suddenly growing importance of the (new) linguistics.
This reason is the disappearance of the person as a useful construct in this era of scientiﬁc
theory of social action . . . The recent resurgence of “rational actor” models is not inconsistent
with my view since 
 
there is little that is speciﬁcally human about rational actors. Without persons being
presupposed as actors, attention necessarily shifts to conﬂuences of observable processes-in-relations. Out of these
emerge actors and locations of social action
 
 (italics in the original).
 
Whitmeyer (1998: 404), in a recent call for the usage and development of
“Human Actor Models” in sociology appears to support White’s diagnosis. He
states that his perspective is not realist because
 
There are no foundational assumptions that anything in the model is real, that is, that the
existence of any element of the model is anything more that a pragmatic assumption, used
because it is useful. Indeed there is no basic assumption that human beings really exist as actors.
 
Rather, along with many others I treat human beings as actors because it seems scientiﬁcally productive, that is,
useful, to do so
 
 (italics in the original). 
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In this manner the conﬂict inherent in the formalist and behavioral realist
strategies can be considered as partially orthogonal to the micro/macro debate
(Lawler, Ridgeway, and Markovsky 1993; Whitmeyer 1994). However, this does
not mean that the 
 
style
 
 of explanation does not differ between the two theoretical
strategies. While formalists prefer abstract model building and (sometimes) a
nomothetic style of explanation, behavioral realists are much more concerned
with specifying micro and macro 
 
mechanisms
 
 around which large scale behavioral
regularities can be explained (Kanazawa 2002). These mechanisms (be they
neuro-cognitive, ecological or physiological) are not merely formal or analytic
constructions (such as group algebras, abstract ecologies or multidimensional
spaces) but “real” in a materialist sense (mental modules, resource shortages,
neurophysiological structures). Formalists, on the other hand, are much more
likely to endorse modes of explanation that can at least in principle dispense with
lower-level accounts of sociological processes.
2.4 The Classical Legacy
In 20th century American sociology, formalism can be said to begin with Talcott
Parsons’ adaptation of Whitehead’s “analytical realism” (Fararo 1989a, 2001) as
a theory construction strategy. This is a misleadingly named philosophical stand-
point, because the primary consequence of adopting this approach is to end up
with an analytical “irrealism” regarding the fundamental entities, substances and
capacities that should be the core concern of the discipline. Something that is not
very often noted is that Parsons’ approach in his classic 
 
Structure of Social Action
 
(1937) was basically the same as that followed by neoclassical economists in
separating an 
 
analytically
 
 deﬁnable realm (“the economy”) from messy reality thus
making it the exclusive object of study of a single discipline. As Marshall and
Pareto understood, this required mathematical formalization (Breslau 2003), and
the postulation of a “pure” abstract realm of economic activity, estranged from
the multidimensional complexity of the real world (Boettke 1997). Parsons’ attempt
to do the same for sociology by postulating an irreducibly (but only abstractly
deﬁned) realm of exclusively “social” processes, culminated in his own version of
a formalist human actor model for sociology (Parsons and Shils 1951) and an
abstract analytical representation of the social system (Parsons 1951) summarized
in the AGIL schema.
Simmel’s attempt to establish an abstract science of pure social forms (Simmel
1971) and his contention that the unique scientiﬁc contribution of sociology
resided on that basis (Simmel 1909) can be considered the second strand of
classical theory responsible for the formalist dream of pure sociology. This is
supported by the fact that most American network theorists trace back their
lineage to Simmel’s work (Boorman and White 1976; Breiger 1990; Breiger and
Ennis 1979: 263, n. 264; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1415; Pescosolido and 
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Rubin 2000; White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976: 730, n. 731), and that they see
themselves as fostering a radical paradigm shift through which the formal classical
tradition of Simmel will ﬁnally be realized (Berkowitz 1982, 1988; Wellman 1988).
 
3. VARIETIES OF FORMALISM IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
 
In this section, I consider the two of the most inﬂuential deployments of the
formalist strategy that have been introduced into American sociology since the
middle of the 20th century. This exercise establishes the point that the varieties of
formalist theorizing cut cross across levels of analysis and that ambitious and
reductionist formalist programs have been offered that either deny the ontological
status of individuals in favor of formalized conceptualizations of social structure
or that reject the independent integrity of social aggregates in favor of formalized
conceptions of individual actors. I begin by discussing the original—and to this
day most inﬂuential version—of formalism in sociology: 
 
systems theory
 
, and by
considering the “unacknowledged offspring” of systems formalism at the micro-level
which I term 
 
micro-formalism
 
. I follow by considering two important features of
contemporary versions of formalism: 
 
top-down eliminitavism
 
 (sociological reductionism)
and their appeal to a 
 
non-mechanismic
 
 version of causation and explanation.
3.1 Systems Theory: the Original Macro-Formalism
Systems theory is the precursor of all formalisms in the social sciences, and all
formalist variants (except the network variety of formalism which draws on the
algebra of group theory and developed its formal shape through graph theory)
owe their existence to it. The versions that have had the most impact on sociology
can be traced back to the systems theory of von Bertalanffy and Norbert Wiener’s
cybernetics and even further back to Marshall and Pareto’s pioneering formaliza-
tion of turn of the 19th century neo-classical economics. One source of confusion
in this respect concerns the tendency to treat “systems theory” as somehow dis-
tinct from the conception of a 
 
dynamical system
 
 (Fararo 1989a), speciﬁed as a set of
differential equations with a speciﬁc number of parameters and starting values
which over time displays some sort of either stable (e.g. cyclical) or complex (e.g.
chaotic) behavior.
“Verbal” systems theory (e.g. the Parsons of 
 
The Social System
 
 [1951] or Niklas
Luhmann’s [1995] autopoetic theory) is usually thought of as abstract theorizing
regarding a set of entities in interaction with their environment whose primary
purpose is to maintain some sort of internal homeostatic balance in the face of
constant environmental disruption away from their “desired” state or as interact-
ing and exchanging inputs and outputs with and adjacent system. What is usually
not recognized is that both of these conceptions of system, one as a mathematical 
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“model object” capable of representing complex patterns of the behavior of some
structure over time or as abstract theorizing about purposive entities which
interact with their environment in order to sustain some sort internal coherence
in the face of environmental disruption are inherently related and come from 19th
century work in the Physics of ﬂuids and engineering (although Luhmann’s ver-
sion owes a lot to the application of these formalisms to problems in meta-biology
[Maturana and Varela 1980]). This is shown by Fararo (1989a) who utilizes both
of these meanings of “system” in his attempt to unify classic Parsonian theory and
more recent structural conceptions of social dynamics.
In systems formalism individuals, societies, and all social entities are reduced to
parameters, variables and starting conditions in a dynamic system of equations.
In many respects, this is the most radical of all formalisms in that in “cleans the
ontological house” of the discipline and replaces all postulated entities with
variables, ﬁxed parameters and their mathematical interrelations, a move similar
to Walras’ general equilibrium formalization of market behavior in neoclassical
economics. Simon’s (1952) translation of Homan’s micro-formalism into a dynamical
systems formalism stands as an early and one of the few exemplars of this type of
formalism in sociology (Fararo 2001). Today, strong versions of systems formalism
have gone from being a potential hegemonic force with the hope of unifying social
science and putting it at the same level of mathematical and theoretical sophisti-
cation as the “advanced” sciences (as Parsons once hoped) to a mostly forgotten
phase in the history of social thought. However, debates derived from extending
the 
 
ontology
 
 implied by systems formalism to the study of social phenomena continue
unabated to this day (Abbott 1988).
3.2 The Foundational Denial of Realism: Micro-Level Formalism
Through this type of formalism we enter the realms of operant learning theory
(Hull 1940), game theory (Nash 1950) and expected utility theory (von Neumann
and Morgenstern 1944). Here the “real” individual is rejected in favor of some
formal model of the 
 
individual’s behavior or internal processes that are prior or
mediate subsequent behavior; a “human actor model” (HAM) in Whitmeyer’s
(1998) terms or a “model of the human agent” in Carley and Newell’s (Carley
and Newell 1994) rendering. Micro-formalism is closer to the “rational” pole of the
social/rational distinction made by Simon (1957) between two competing models
of man. By “social”, in our terms, Simon was referring to a more behavioral-
realist model of the human agent (Carley and Newell 1994). Thus human
actor models can be arranged in a continuum from the “simplest” (and therefore
closer to formalism) to the most “complex” (and thus “realist” in our sense). The
“rational” model is simply one type of micro-formalism. There can be other types
that do not necessarily look like the classic expected utility model of the agent
dominant in economics. The key characteristic of micro-formalism is the rejection50 Omar Lizardo
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of “realisticness” (Maki 2002) as a desirable property of the actor model (Kanazawa 1998)
in favor of the instrumentalist principle of predictive success or what Whitmeyer
(1998) refers—unintendedly echoing Friedman’s (1953) classic statement in the
methodology of economics—to as the “pragmatist” criterion.
Various micro-behavioral models of action currently popular in sociology are
primarily a hybrid of some micro-formalism—either based on the “forward
looking” notion of expected utility (Coleman 1990) or the “backward looking”
learning-theoretic formalism (Macy 1990)—coupled with an equally formalist
network representation of structure; beginning with the path-breaking work of
Emerson (1972) and the early (1982) and recent (1992) theoretical and empirical
work of Ronald Burt. In a similar way, James Coleman’s (1990) idea of grand
sociology was precisely a generalization of the expected utility behavioral-formalist
model of the human agent popular in economics coupled with its integration
into network formalism. An actor-level micro-formalism coupled with systems
formalism leads to the grand theory of Talcott Parsons (if we dump the ﬂirtations
with Freudian psychoanalysis—a (bio-cognitive) behavioral realism—and replace
the behavioral part with a learning theory formalism as shown in Martin [2001]).
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Micro-formalist control models of the individual agent in social psychology (Heise
1979; Powers 1973) also fall in this category and by combining systems formalism
at the macro level and a control model at the micro-level it is possible to get right
back to Parsons model of social institutions as cybernetic control systems of
human behavior once again (Fararo 2001).
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4. SOME TENDENCIES OF FORMALIST REASON(ING)
4.1 Sociological Reductionism
One of the primary features of formalism is its tendency to deny the need for
microfoundations in sociological theory. This is done by conceiving of the
traditional lower-level entities postulated in “naïve” (or “pre-scientiﬁc) versions of
sociology (personality, individuals, etc.) as a by-product (or epiphenomenon) of the
functioning of some more fundamental set of higher or “inter-level” structures
and processes (Abbott 2001b: 266; Collins 2004: 4–5; White 1992). This is what
DiTomaso (1982) refers to as sociological reductionism. Thus, some formalists
attempt to deny both the casual efﬁcacy and the ontological status (that is the
existence) of individuals or persons. A useful term from the philosophy of mind that
can be utilized to refer to this feature of formalism is eliminitavism (Churchland 1986).
In the philosophy of mind, bottom-up eliminativists attempt to legislate against the
usage of “mentalist” language and concepts (usually derided as “folk psychology”)
and advocate their replacement or the exclusive usage of material or neurobio-
logical concepts (Churchland 1981). The basic ontological postulate is that mental
states are equivalent to brain states. In sociology, formalists—(e.g. Black 2000a;Formalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge 51
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Mayhew 1980)—proceed in a similar manner. The basic argument is that taking
“the individual” as an foundational ontological or scientiﬁc object is useless, since
individuals (as fundamental foundational entities) do not exist, and in fact can be
decomposed into some other set of more fundamental processes. Thus talk about
individuals (“folk sociology”), can in principle be replaced with talk about some
other sort of unit from which individuals are derived (“scientiﬁc sociology”). In
this sense individuals are derived from this other entity (White 1997), usually a
macrolevel or relational process and/or reduced to it, in the very same way that
the older conception of the atom as a substantialist building block of matter is
desubstantialized as a bundle of forces and relations between forces in contemporary
high-energy physics.
Prominent Examples of top-down eliminitavism can be found in the work of
Harrison White (White 1992; White 1997)—especially his early work out of
Harvard (Boorman and White 1976; White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976)—Niklas
Luhmann and Stephan Fuchs (2005), this last two somewhat softened by cultural-
constructivist tendencies. The classical inspiration for this kind of theorizing
comes from the formalist portion of the work of Georg Simmel. The latter was
of course a behavioral-realist in other facets of his work as exempliﬁed in his
classic essay “The Metropolis and Mental Life”, where cognition, emotion and a
“realist” ecology ﬁgure prominently. For ontological formalists identiﬁed with the
network analysis tradition of research some mathematical object (e.g. a graph, a
multidimensional space) becomes the ontological basis for subsequent theorizing.
Strong statements of the structural-selectionist formalism (a hybrid of network theory
and formalist ecological theory) also fall in this category, with the formalization
of the n-dimensional niche and the reduction of individuals as passive resources
on this niche on which higher level aggregate entities feed (McPherson 2004).
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An important early proponent of top-down eliminitavism in sociology is
Mayhew (1980, 1981). Mayhew displayed all of the usual symptoms of a “pure”
formalist. For Mayhew, the “individual” was mere mythology and attitudes and
other intrapsychic phenomena were nothing but pre-scientiﬁc prejudices and
metaphysical chimera echoing an older Comtean stance (Hayek 1943; 1942).
Thus, Sociology would not be a true scientiﬁc enterprise until those entities were
banished from our descriptions and explanations of social phenomena. Not
surprisingly given the “elective afﬁnity” between this stance and a preference for
certain styles of mathematical formalization Mayhew was a strong advocate of
graph theory and combinatorics (Mayhew and Levinger 1976b: 87) as the primary
formalist tools with which pure structuralist processes (distribution of resources,
occupational differentiation, etc.) could be represented.
For instance, Mayhew attempted to derive a theory of the origins of inequality
that made no reference to individual differences whether psychological or biological
and criticized Pareto and Sorokin on this account (Mayhew and Schollaert 1980:
36) because the latter viewed inequality and societal stratiﬁcation as founded
upon individual differences both psychological and biological. Tellingly, this52 Omar Lizardo
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“outdated” Paretian hypothesis, is now one of the primary lines of attack on
formalism by the new behavioral-realism emerging out of evolutionary psychology
(e.g. Kanazawa 2002) and cognitive and personality psychology (Caplan 2003;
Kilduff and Krackhardt 1994; Kilduff and Tsai 2005; Kilduff, Tsai, and Hanke
2006; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 2001).
A similar set of theoretical strategies can be seen in the work of Niklas
Luhmann (1995). In Luhmann’s work a set of disembodied socio-cognitive processes
(e.g. communication and observation) takes the place of the irreducible building
blocks of social theory. Individuals, and other sort of entities, ﬁgure as either
interfaces and specialized channels regulating the ﬂow of communications, or are
in fact simply bundles of communications that are reiﬁed when talked about and
referred to (by other observers relaying communications from within or without
the system being referred to) as if frozen in time and space. In a manner compar-
able to that of Luhmann certain formulations of “meta-biological” autopoetic
theory (which greatly inﬂuenced Luhmann’ s thinking), point to other ﬂeeting
processes, such as boundaries and communicatively accomplished minimal dis-
tinctions between “an inside and an outside” (Fuchs 2005) which may also come
to play the role of foundational (quasi)entities. As is customary in this type of
theorizing, the actual “wetware” on which this set of processes is actually imple-
mented (such as the human bio-cognitive system) recedes into the background and
does not ﬁgure as part of—or as a constraint on—the theoretical structure.
Donald Black’s (1976; 1979; 1995; 2000a; 2000b) turn toward the “qualitative”
mathematics of geometrical spaces (with their various distances and proximities)
and functional forms (linearity, curvilinearity, monotonicity, etc.), which he uses to
develop theories about the “behavior” of macro-level entities (law, science, art,
terrorism, etc.) can also be regarded as a form of top-down eliminitavism. While
Black (2000a) claims that his interdictions against the usage of psychological,
mentalist or voluntaristic (all combined under the rubric of “teleological”) language
is simply a “methodological holist” move, some his stronger assertions regardless
the “behavior” of this or that superordinate entity independently of individual activity can
be considered a form of top-down eliminitavism, where macrolevel entities “do
their thing” in apparent independence from lower level units.
Other versions of top-down reductionism include some strong formulations of
Marxist historical materialism, especially as formulated in the work of Althusser.
This latter was a systems formalist in the (late) Parsonian sense (DiTomaso 1982),
but Althusser can also be interpreted as a formalist in the stronger (eliminativist)
sense exempliﬁed in Mayhew (1981) and Black (2000a). For Althusser the “indi-
vidual” or “the person” was not a coherent scientiﬁc category but simply a his-
torical “bourgeois” invention and “structures” (both ideological and economic)
were primary and constitutive of individuality in the strong sense as subjectivity
itself arose out the imaginary identiﬁcation with (or “interpellation” into) an
overarching (material and semiotic) structural order. In this sense Althusser was a
“relational” theorist through and through (DiTomaso 1982: 18).Formalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge 53
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4.2 Anti-Mechanismic Explanation
Various formalists, as exempliﬁed in the work of Bruce Mayhew, Donald Black,
The late Peter Blau of Inequality and Heterogeneity (1977), and (some formulations of)
the macro-side of Jonathan Turner (e.g. Turner 1995, but not Turner 2000a),
promote a non-mechanismic model of explanation (Bechtel and Abrahamsen
2005; Bunge 1997).
11 This formulation of formalism—in contrast to top-down
reductionism—does not deny the existence of individuals only their casual efﬁcacy,
which if we follow Hacking (1983), constitutes its own form of ontological irreal-
ism regarding individuals. The basic postulate is that social facts cause other social
facts in a regular law-like fashion. These types of formalists are concerned with
the discovery and formulation of general relationships and propositions phrased
in covering-law style (Hempel 1965). Black’s classic The Behavior of Law (1976) is
still the best exemplar of this formalist approach.
12 The inspiration comes from a
particularly narrow interpretation of the methodological proposals of Durkheim
(especially as articulated in Suicide and The Rules of the Sociological Method) and the
foundational disciplinary directives of August Comte.
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These theorists are like other formalists in that they radically aspire to an
ontologically pure sociology (Black 1979), devoid of reference to any lower-level
processes, and entities (such as beliefs, desires, individuals, or even action). Social
phenomena are described as forces acting upon other social forces (Turner 1995).
Causation is seen as “direct” that is, occurring by way of a social fact or aggregate
entity or process impinging upon another social fact located at the same scale and
level of abstraction. This leads toward the advocacy of the explanatory “covering
law” model proposed in Hempel (1965)—even while allowing for probabilistic
relaxations of the stipulation of universal co-occurrence.
14 This is the reason why
an advocate of “pure” sociology such as Mayhew, prescribed a Hempelian model
of explanation (Mayhew and Levinger 1976a: 1033; Mayhew and Levinger
1976b: 86) in which the formulation of a purely predictive model connecting the
covariation between two types of phenomena (without speciﬁcation of intervening
mechanisms) was synonymous with having “explained” the phenomenon of inter-
est. In their allegiance to this form of deductive-nomological explanation with no
reference to lower level mechanisms, most formalists—e.g. Blau, Black, Mayhew,
etc.—while erroneously claiming allegiance to the Durkheimian tradition, can be
more accurately said to belong to the Comtean legacy (which forbade theorists from
referring to lower-level unobservables) that was criticized and actually rejected by
Durkheim (Schmaus 1985).
4.3 Verisimilitude, Protected Properties and Substrate-Independence
Above and beyond the reductionist and anti-mechanismic tendencies of formalism
the three most important features of formalism that produce friction vis a vis54 Omar Lizardo
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behavioral realism are 1) The denial of verisimilitude a necessary property of formal
models (Maki 2002). That is, the lack of concern that the formal apparatus of the
theory bears any analogical (or intuitive) resemblance to the real world capabilities
of the human agent in models of social behavior for instance (Friedman 1953). 2)
the associated concern with predictive power as explanation rather than the dis-
covery of the true principles of functioning and structure of the intervening lower
levels mechanisms (Friedman 1953), and ﬁnally 3) The principle of substrate-independence
(Abbott 2001a; Laughlin and Pines 2000; Simmel 1910; White 1992): or the
claim that the task of science is to discover abstract, isomorphic structural patterns
that apply to the organization of phenomena at any level of analysis and regardless of
the intrinsic attributes of the entities concerned, which leads to a denial of level-speciﬁc
properties and features of reality and even more importantly which denies the
realist intuition that empirical world constitutes a stratiﬁed order (Archer 1995;
Bhaskar 1998; Whitmeyer 1994) whereby the properties and features of higher
level entities depend on some fundamental—e.g. casual—way on the properties
and features of—potentially unobservable—lower level entities, and that the pri-
mary task of science is to “keep digging down” in order to discover the structure
of the fundamental constituents of reality and their laws of functioning.
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The discipline where the substrate-independence debate has achieved the most
sophistication is Physics, where the matter has pitted solid state physicists (playing
the role of the formalists) against particle physicists (here of course the use of
mathematical formalism does not serve to distinguish between the two theorizing
styles). The ﬁrst salvo was an inﬂuential paper by Anderson (1972), entitled
“More is Different,” where he argued for the empirical and theoretical autonomy
of higher level processes in physical chemistry, and against the reductionist and
“constructivist” (i.e. the idea that only knowledge of the lower level parts is
necessary to reconstruct the whole) hubris of particle physicists. More recently
in a series of papers, Laughlin, Pines and colleagues (Laughlin and Pines 2000;
Laughlin, Pines, Schmalian, Stojkovic, and Wolynes 2000) following Anderson’s lead,
have proposed the ideas of “protectorates” and called for physics to reorient itself
to the study of “protected properties of matter” as a counterpoint to the obsessive
search for fundamental laws of matter and energy in particle physics. For Lauglin,
Pines et al. (2000: 32) protected properties are “actually caused by collective
organizing principles that formally grow out of the microscopic rules but are in a
real sense independent of them” and as such, “ferromagnetism, metallic conduction,
hydrodynamics, and so forth are ‘protected’ properties of matter—generic behavior
that is reliably the same in one system to the next, regardless of details” (italics
added). The basic idea here is that there may be principles of organization in
matter (e.g. superconductivity) that show up everywhere certain material com-
plexes are allowed to be organized in the same way, regardless of the lower level
properties of the system (i.e. details about quantum mechanical processes) and in
partial independence from the level (micro, meso macro) or aggregation. This is
a clear example of the (formalist) principle of substrate independence.Formalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge 55
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4.4 Protected Social Properties in Sociology
In sociology, various potentials candidates for “protected social properties” have
been proposed in the literature (even if there is little awareness of the paradig-
matic wars between high-energy and condensed matter physicists): with variations
of the power-dependence network exchange formalism (Willer 1987, 1999;
Willer and Anderson 1981) being the most empirically successful contender. It is
also no accident that advocates of protected social properties are all sociological
formalists of one stripe or another. Just like in Physics, protected social properties
should explain regularities at different levels of aggregation, and should arise
everywhere reasonably complex systems of social interaction can be found,
regardless of the lower-levels features of their constituents.
Thus, Burt has applied his structural theory of action to entities ranging from
individuals (Burt 1982, 1992), to ﬁrms in competitive markets, which would make
structural autonomy a possible protected social property. In a similar way advocates
of the “elementary theory” (Willer 1999) research program claim that their basic
principles can explain the behavior of all types of entities, ranging from individuals,
to countries and empires in the world system. Therefore, features such as the types
of power (strong, weak, etc.) that appear as a result of exchange (see the review
in Walker, Thye, Simpson, Lovaglia, Willer, and Markovsky 2000: 325–327), can
be considered protected social properties that appear at multiple levels of analysis
and independently of more detailed contextual factors. Thus, another way to
interpret Coleman’s (1990) monumental Foundations is to see it as one very sophis-
ticated attempt to reconceptualize some of the most basic concepts of social
theory, (i.e. power, interest and control) as protectorates, which can then be used
to explain the behavior of a wide range of entities at different levels of aggregation
and complexity, including natural persons, groups or “legal”, corporate persons
(e.g. corporations), allowing the analyst to speak of aggregates as having “interests”
for instance.
While the substrate-independence principle is a hallmark of formalist theorizing
(White 1997), and the most powerful and convincing claim to the power and
promise of the approach it gets into trouble precisely because as a formalist
offshoot, it runs roughshod over concerns regarding verisimilitude and realism at
the level of the human agent (Carley and Newell 1994). It is thus not surprising
that Burt (1982) has ﬂirted with, and Willer (1999) actively recommends as a
useful scientiﬁc device, nothing other than the expected utility version of the
human agent (clinching White’s [1997] intuition that irrealism is the basis of
all formalism); the very same model that is now under attack by behavioral
economists.
The reason for this is that by assuming the substrate independence (and the
ontological “non-substantiality”) of protected properties the analyst is led to deny
that they depend on (or are substantively constrained by) in any meaningful
way on “lower level” (material, psychological, biological) processes (Laughlin et al.56 Omar Lizardo
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2000). In the case of the social and behavioral sciences these properties would be
the body, cognition and neurophysiology, while in physics they are quantum
processes. This explains why formalists in physics hail from condensed matter
physics and portray high-energy (particle) physicists as “reductionist” but do not
realize that they are engaging in their own kind of “top-down” reductionism
(DiTomaso 1982). In this way they deny the singular claim of a view of the world
that depends on a stratiﬁed ontology or that we need realistic models of those
lower level entities in order to move forward with the business of explaining the
world (Laughlin and Pines 2000).
Formalists in structural social psychology (e.g. Lawler, Ridgeway, and Markovsky
1993) for instance, put forth the “Colemanian” viewpoint that the application of
the substrate-independence principle (anchored to generic ﬁndings of interaction
dynamics in laboratory settings) to different levels of social organization may be
the key to micro-macro problem because it eliminates the issue of aggregation.
From a behavioral realist perspective however, this “interactor” (Whitmeyer 1994)
formalism is not a solution, because it violates the (behavioral realist) ontological
principle that social reality consists of stratiﬁed realms, the principles of function-
ing of which are (at least partially) level-speciﬁc because they are generated from
the characteristic form of functioning and organization of their lower-level con-
stituents elements and depend in a non-trivial way on the inherent properties of
those elements.
5. FORMALISM IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING: AN ASSESSMENT
If uniﬁcation and theoretical integration are the ultimate goals of both formalists
and behavioral realists, why then do formalist sociologists insist on rejecting
insights derived from what should be sociology’s lower-level adjunct disciplines
such as psychology, cognitive science, or neuroscience? I submit that the
formalist mistake comes from thinking that a scientiﬁc ontology can consist of
inherently unobservable processes, instead of potentially observable entities, with processes
derived from fundamental units or building blocks as opposed to the other way
around.
In this respect Fararo (1989a, 1989b) is, to my limited knowledge, unique among
formalists in that due to the philosophical sophistication of his approach he is
actually well aware of this very problematic and incisively argues, drawing on the
work of Alfred North Whitehead, for the suitability of a process ontology (1989a:
chap 1) for the social sciences as a substitution for what he perceives to be the
dominant entity-based ontology of the discipline. In this sense the argument below is
a direct challenge to this plea for a process-based ontology for sociology. I argue
instead that entities must be empirically and logically prior to processes. To put it
bluntly, you can derive processes from entities but not the other way around. This
boils down to a battle between a “processes-all-the-way-down” metatheoretical stanceFormalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge 57
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versus one that still retains a (scientiﬁc) conviction on the existence of ultimate
foundational building blocks of (social) reality, which we can refer to as “the-processes-
stop-here” point of view. The only other coherent statement of a self-conscious process
ontological viewpoint is that of Andrew Abott (1988) whose work is difﬁcult to
classify with the schema proposed here, but who becomes a formalist by default
in his rejection of an entity-based ontology in favor of a view of social reality as
primarily composed of free-ﬂoating boundaries and relations and not substances.
Lee Freese, after considering the standard microsociological processual theories
of interaction (e.g. Blumer 1986; Mead 1934) realizes that ontology of processes
will always fail to solve the basic conceptual problems of the discipline. He puts
the matter in this way (1988: 95–96):
An alternative interpretation of social interaction is needed if biophysical ecosystems and
human social systems satisfy an identical evolutionary process. Moreover, to argue that they do,
we shall have to identify in theory the parts of which social systems are assembled, the irreducible
entities that compose into their structure and function. In other words, we shall have to theoretically discover what
social systems are made of . . . Finding that social systems are composed of their interpersonal interactions,
presumed to aggregate somehow into various patterns of institutionalized normative culture, would lead us to the
wrong irreducible entities-wrong in that they are not the parts whose change can cause the system to evolve
(emphasis mine).
The concern with ﬁnding the right “irreducible entities” has not been salient
in contemporary sociological theory, possibly because of the wide appeal of
suspiciously convenient formalist solutions to the problem. John Levi Martin
(2003) has recently put forth a sophisticated argument against the notion that the
speciﬁcation and usage of mechanisms should be a priority in social theory, in
favor of more provisional ﬁeld theoretic accounts (the only theoretical position
that can be considered a true hybrid of both formalism and behavioral-realism
currently extant). He puts the matter thus:
Accordingly, I will admit the necessarily provisional nature of all ﬁeld theories . . . while arguing
for their utility, and I admit that the absence of mechanisms may be a theoretical weakness in a
number of respects. However, in the case of sociological analysis, there are extremely good
reasons not to automatically privilege a theory that can be linked to mechanisms. Because
individuals (or at least individual acts) are frequently though not inevitably the level below those units described
by sociological theories, mechanisms tend to involve action by individuals. While we all must appreciate the robust
realism of appealing to the nature of individuals, who certainly do exist, great dangers lurk here for theorizing.
This is because social science is the unique case in which the lower level appealed to by mechanistic accounts is
ourselves, and we have a great number of prejudices about our own constitutions that we cannot rid ourselves of,
because we do not know what all of them are.
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But notice that Martin’s reticence against the usage of mechanisms in social
science has to do the with the special self-reﬂexive status of humans as being
simultaneously the primary mechanisms and the authors of scientiﬁc accounts of
how those mechanism work (this is analogous to the “folk psychology” problematic
in the philosophy of mind [Churchland 1981]). But this viewpoint assumes the58 Omar Lizardo
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impossibility of ever moving beyond those “prejudices” that we have regarding
our “self-constitutions.”
But this is precisely the role that cognitive psychology should play in sociology: the problem
with most social theory is that it is both naïve as to the motivational, emotive and
cognitive constraints of both the member of the collectivities theorized about or
empirically observed and the motivational, emotive and cognitive constraints of
the theorizer or observer. A true scientiﬁc/empirical epistemology as an aid to
production of better scientiﬁc knowledge in the social sciences can only be put to
work in conjunction with increasing integration of social theory with systematic
knowledge of the constraints and capabilities of the human bio-cognitive architecture,
and the role that it may play in the unique process of scientiﬁc self-observation.
This is directly related to an underappreciated argument put forth Frederick
Bates and Walter Peacock on the reasons why classiﬁcatory aggregations of individuals
cannot be the building blocks of structural models of society in the tradition of Blau
(1977). This the way that they put it (1989: 575–576):
Sociologists misconceive the nature of social structure when they treat abstract mental
categories used to summarize the similarities and differences among social units or actors as
building blocks to construct structural models of society. This is simply wrong, because it is
inconsistent with the assumptions upon which classiﬁcation as a logical procedure is based.
Classes in a classiﬁcation schemes result form particular mental operations, and because of this
they cannot, by any deﬁnition that remains faithful to the meaning of classiﬁcation as a
procedure, be treated as objective phenomena occurring outside the mind of the classiﬁer.
While Bates and Peacock exclude relations from their argument because they
consider them to be more concrete than categories, there is no reason to think of
relations as less of a cognitive construct and or as less subject to cultural and
classiﬁcatory mediation than other cognitive schemata, as is becoming increas-
ingly clear from recent advances in structural theory itself (Krackhardt 1987).
Contrast this stance to White’s (1997) formalist claim that
Interactions, ties in sociocultural context, are coming to supplant persons as building blocks-and
a person may come to be seen as a knotted vortex among social networks. As mentioned earlier,
multiple sorts of spaces, even nonintegral dimensionalities, are now recognized in several natural
sciences, and surely this and related viewpoints on temporality that can also be found in social
science . . . should encourage analogous development for sociocultural processes (White 1997:
64).
However, networks and spaces like other forms of socio-scientiﬁc conceptuali-
zation are a heuristic cognitive device (“thought constructs” in Schutz’s [1954]
terms) and cannot for this reason be thought of as the building blocks of social
structure, nor can sociology be deﬁned as the exclusive study of these formal rela-
tional processes. This is not to say that relational processes (or any other kind of
process for that matter) are to be excluded from sociological study, but that they
must be anchored to non-processual foundational entities which enact the processFormalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge 59
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as part of their activity (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000); and I am suggesting
that the most plausible (but not necessarily the only possible ones) such entities
available are bio-cognitive individuals as traditionally conceived in the behavioral
sciences (Gintis 2007).
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This is the case by virtue of sociology’s subject matter (collective behavior), not
because individuals are metaphysically irreducible to lower level processes. The
relevant sciences that should be more closely coupled with sociology (psychology,
neurophysiology, cognitive science) are in charge of doing just that. In other
words, sociologists concerned with deconstructing the person (e.g. White 1992)
are akin to cosmologists trying to deconstruct the atom (instead of nebula, solar
systems and other material aggregates): ﬁrst, they are the wrong thing to decon-
struct (because sociologists are seldom interested in persons per se) and second,
there are already people working on the matter in other disciplines.
Further, their insights are usable to sociologists both metatheoretically (as a way
of checking our biases) and substantively what is metatheoretical for sociology is
“theoretical” for lower-level disciplines (Dimaggio 1997); instead of reinventing
the wheel (or denying that we need any wheels), sociologists should attempt to
integrate their insights across disciplines. Economists have already gone through
the formalist self-sufﬁciency path and all that they sowed was a theoretically
impoverished science (Mirowski 2001). Pure formalism is in danger of leading
American sociology in a similar direction; just because the formal apparatus
brought to bear by these sociologists involves graph theory or some other form of
non-standard mathematics, it does not imply that this metatheoretical move is not
stylistically equivalent to the attempt to boil everything down to the expected utility
calculus. Both theoretical strategies are reductionistic (just because we are used to
thinking about reductionism in bottom-up terms does not mean that the top-
down imperialism of network analysis is not reduction), and both lead to (logically
and empirically) closed systems: that is they are capable of being used for knowl-
edge production without reference to constructs, mechanisms and processes from
other sciences.
5.1 Pragmatist Irrealism as a Consequence of the Formalist Strategy
Those who deploy the formalist strategy are generally committed to form of
epistemological realism. However, by making use of formalism, they end up advo-
cating a form of pragmatic irrealism when it comes to the properties and qualities
of formal models. This tension becomes readily apparent in recent attempts to
combine behavioral-realist and formalist model construction strategies on the part
of the same theorist.
Take for instance Whitmeyer’s (1998: 404) simultaneous claims that he is not
concerned with realism, while at the same time being attentive to the compatibility
between his Human Actor Model (HAM) and the micromechanisms of motivation60 Omar Lizardo
© 2009 The Author
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009
and cognition being discovered in other ﬁelds (1998: 410), (not to mention his
earlier [1994] rejection of the substrate-independence principle in favor a strati-
ﬁed ontology). These positions are in conﬂicting tension and reveal Whitmeyer as
much more committed to behavioral realism than he claims to be, especially
because of his attention to issues related to the compatibility of his HAM with
cognitive science, anthropology and symbolic interactionist sociology. For Whit-
meyer (1998: 427–428), one the virtues of his proposed HAM is precisely that
“ . . . it uniﬁes many diverse approaches to individual behavior” and that “ . . . it
clearly acknowledges the link between human behavior and its physical and
evolutionary bases,” which “. . . lends the social scientist the support of lower-level
scientiﬁc models.” However, notice that this is hardly the “pragmatist” criterion
of model selection (which concentrates on “usefulness” and) which dispenses with
realism (Whitmeyer 1998: 405), but it is closer to a concern for “realisticness”
(Maki 2002) and verisimilitude characteristic of the behavioral realist theoretical
strategy. Whitmeyer’s HAM because of the formalist mathematics involved (which
involve minimization of quantities—the obverse of homo economicus—and the usage
of a multidimensional space), however is a classic example of a generalized micro-
formalism in the vein of Becker and Coleman.
A similar conﬂict plagues Kanazawa’s (1998) simultaneous approval of
Friedman’s endorsal of unrealism as a desirable property of the assumption set of
general theoretical models and his more recent espousal (2001; 2002) of the
evolutionary psychological behavioral realism. The conﬂict remains even under
Kanazawa’s much weaker deﬁnition of the term unrealistic as implying “incom-
pleteness” but not falsity. The reason for this is that the truth or falsity of a given
theory’s assumptions cannot determined individually for each separate assump-
tion as Kanazawa believes but instead applies to the whole set of assumptions as
an integrated whole (Quine 1953). A set of incomplete assumptions is therefore
perforce both unrealistic and false and the task of theory building is to build
more complex and realist assumption sets that have accuracy (realism), depth
(verisimilitude)  and external consistency (consilience) as initially proposed by
Bunge (1961).
Under Kanazawa’s original anti-realist stance for instance, it would be hard to
explain why he felt a need to turn to Evolutionary Psychology (Kanazawa 2001)
as a solution to the origins of preferences problems in the constrained maximization
model of choice if he did not think that the unrealism of the Stigler-Becker
assumption that preferences are exogenous and consistent is a roadblock to theoretical
and explanatory progress in the social sciences. Notice that this argument does
not entail a denial of the fact that all theories are false (because incomplete) in
some fundamental sense. What is argued from the behavioral realist viewpoint is
that the formalist presumption that theoretical assumption sets must be minimal
and simplistic should be a desirable property of theoretical assumption sets instead
of something that should be attempted to be remedied by continuing theoretical
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This behavioral realist stance also denies that some assumptions can be “kept”
in an unrealistic state for purposes of mathematical convenience even in the presence
of corroborating evidence from other disciplines that that particular assumption simply
does not correspond with empirical reality. While incompleteness—and thus irrealism—
in theoretical assumptions can never be overcome, theoretical progress entails the
constrained elaboration of assumptions of a theory if that elaboration furthers depth
and consilience (Bunge 1961). As Rabin (2002: 672) puts it: “the realization that
many details of human behavior must be ignored does not justify blanket com-
placency about the behavioral validity of our assumptions. It is plainly and patently
bad social science to say we do not care how realistic our assumptions are.”
Another problem with the championing of unrealism as desirable criterion of
assumption sets—as a way to better play the “theoretical fruitfulness” game under
the mistaken assumption that “deductive fertility” deﬁned in the narrowest of
terms (as the “number” of new implications derived) should be more important
than the establishment of sound premises from which to commence the deduction—
is that it inevitably leads to the treatment of theoretical assumptions as a radically
arbitrary mathematico-logical game of axiomatics (e.g. Arrow and Debreu 1954).
Here the researcher is only constrained by her imagination in the postulation of this
or that capacity or entity in the world. This I argue, inevitably leads to an instru-
mentalist notion of theories as algorithms for the production of predictions (e.g. Jasso
1988) and not as representational attempts to model the underlying structure of the
“slice of the world” with which each discipline is concerned (Bechtel and Abra-
hamsen 2005; Morrison and Morgan 1999). Ultimately, Friedman’s pragmatist
criterion for model selection is incompatible with the “verisimilitude imperative”
of behavioral realism, because as pointed out by Joel Levine (1993: 9)—in the
context of a critique of the network-theoretic penchant for formalist excursions
into graph theoretical representations of structure—“ . . . we are not entirely free
to construct methods according to the mathematical possibilities. Reality must be
heard from” (italics added).
6. BEHAVIORAL-REALIST INCURSIONS INTO FORMALIST GROUND
6.1 Considering Gender
The current incompatibility between pure formalist and behavioral-realist approaches
can be most clearly appreciated through a juxtaposition of formalist accounts of
categorical individual differences such as gender differences. Formalists (McPher-
son 2004) emphasize structural patterns of relations and their role in creating
cumulative differences across individuals that later on congeal into the discrete
categories of man and woman. Behavioral-realists that draw on neuro-endocrinology
on the other hand (e.g. Udry 2000) or evolutionary psychology (Kanazawa 2002),
highlight the role of physiological and developmental factors along with enduring62 Omar Lizardo
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cognitive-emotive and information processing biases of ultimate evolutionary
origin that are not reducible to socio-relational processes. They conclude that
gender constructivism (whether cultural-cognitive or structural-relational) must in
the end face limits best described in biopsychological terms (Udry 2000).
Analogous calls can be heard from those behavioral-realists that prefer a closer
dialogue between sociology and the cognitive sciences, especially cognitive
psychology (DiMaggio 2002). Cultural sociologists have begun to realize that in
order to study how cultural systems are produced, developed and transmitted in
human collectivities (Carley 1989, 1995) it is imperative to begin to pay attention
to the information processing and communicative capabilities of individuals and
how these interact with and are affected by the socio-relational and structural
contexts characteristic of certain groups (Carley 1989).
17 For DiMaggio (2002: 275)
this implies abandoning the hope of a cognitive sociology that is “autochthonous”
in relation to psychological research and theory on cognitive processes, and one
that instead builds on those psychological foundations. For DiMaggio, insights
from “. . . cognitive and [psychological] social psychology have become indispensable
for sociologists who are interested both in how cultural processes enter into indi-
vidual lives and how such processes enter into some kinds of collective behavior”,
in addition to being of prime importance for those who are interested in “micro-
foundational theories of action.”
6.2 Personality and Social Networks
An important debate that has to this point been internal to the network analytic
tradition and that is exemplary of the type of formalist/behavioral-realist ideal-
typical distinction that I am trying to establish is that currently brought to the fore
by researchers who study the relationship between categorical and psychological
attributes such as personality types or membership and identiﬁcation with racial
and gender groups and the composition of ego networks. This speciﬁc dispute is
particularly informative because in contrast to the biology versus constructivism
controversy in the sociology of gender this debate is internal to the social networks
literature and cannot be considered simply an example of defensive cross-disciplinary
turf warfare.
In a revealing review of the literature, Martin Kilduff and David Krackhardt
(1994) criticize (formalist) structuralist minded researchers for ignoring and dis-
missing the role of cognition and individual level processes of categorization in
the formation and perception of relational ties. Kilduff and Krackhardt conclude
that cognitive processes have to be reintegrated into the analysis of social network
composition and other structural outcomes, and completely reject the top-down
“sociological reductionism” (DiTomaso 1982), of an earlier generation of network
researchers. They note (1994: 87–88) that networks researchers have “. . . tended
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been a constant thesis in network theory that “students of social structure need
not be concerned with individual or individual-level variables.” In the radical
eliminativist perspectives of Mayhew for instance it is argued that the individual
is nothing but a “dead end” the study of which has been “superseded” by the
“analysis of the structure of relations” a situation which renders structure and
individual as “ostensibly incommensurable” entities.
But Kilduff and Krackhardt detect an important incongruity in this dismissive
attitude toward individual-level cognitive factors by the structuralist group given
that social network analysis is itself an offspring of psychological approaches to
the analysis of human behavior. They point out (p. 88) that it is an “irony” that
social network analysts repeatedly tend to portray their research as a alternative
paradigm completely unrelated to individual psychology since “. . . social network
research has been heavily dependent on the very psychology it has purported to
reject.” In contrast they propose that psychology and structuralism “.  .  .  have
much to offer to each other” and note such notable interdisciplinary contributors
to network analysis and theory such as Kurt Lewin, Fritz Heider and Leon Festinger.
Thus rather that eliminating the psychological and cognitive domain thus
ignoring the role of the individual in network research they propose that “ . . . the
individual must be brought back in to acknowledge and account for the microfoundations of
structural research” (1994: 88, emphasis mine).
In a more recent article on the role of personality differences on network
composition and workplace performance Ajay Mehra, Martin Kilduff and David
J. Brass (2002) reach a similar conclusion regarding the heretofore dismissive
stance that structuralist theorists have displayed toward factors related to variation
in personality characteristics and their impact on the dynamics and structure of
personal networks. They note (2002: 121) that organizational research on struc-
tural position has “.  .  .  neglected  .  .  .  the possibility that the network positions
occupied by individuals might be inﬂuenced by their psychology.” They also point
out that neglected factors in network theorizing such as personality differences, in
combination with the structural context of opportunity, might in the end inﬂuence
important networks outcomes. Kilduff and Tsai (2005: 36), conclude that “there
is no doubt that the individual is back in network analysis despite the efforts of
some structuralists to reduce the individual to an epiphenomenal residue of
network processes.” This recent attention to intrapersonal processes in network
theory is strictly parallel to a renewed appreciation of individual personality
differences as providing a renewed tool with which to break away from traditional
rational actor formalisms in economics (Caplan 2003).
6.3 The Origins of Social Networks and Mental Modules
Satoshi Kanazawa (2002) criticizes structural network theory for smuggling
crypto-individualist assumptions about the actors tastes and preferences. At the64 Omar Lizardo
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same time these theorists deny that there is any need to refer to these or to
theorize about their structure. Even more importantly they make the stronger
claim that all that matters are relational patterns at the expense of durable cog-
nitive or biophysical attributes of individuals. Kanazawa also takes the cultural
transmission theories developed by ecological structuralists (Mark 1998) to task
precisely because they focus exclusively on relational patterns of transmission
while denying that inherent individual biases and preferences may sometimes be
more important than relations conduits in determining patterns of taste.
In essence, Kanazawa suggests that while structuralist theories are good at
putting forth explanations for static distributions of relations or contents that ﬂow
through those relations they are unable to answer to question as to the genesis of
the relations themselves and whether individuals have differential propensities to
accept or reject certain contents that ﬂow through those relations (e.g. cultural
tastes) regardless of whether they are available via certain relational pathways.
For Kanazawa, the network theory formalism faces an enduring challenge from
evolutionary psychological behavioral realisms that attempt to get at the ultimate
cognitive and biophysical origins of all sorts of preferences and tendencies includ-
ing preferences associated with who to relate to and who to avoid (Kanazawa
2001). Further the top-down reductionist way in which network theorists handle
the origins of attitudes, practices and tastes (as “products” of network exposure)
must be revised in order to accommodate insights from lower level sciences.
The common theme running through this emerging critique of formalist elim-
initavism in network theory can be considered a behavioral realist rejection of
pure formalism. Furthermore, this is a realization that the inability of the formalist
approach to accommodate the scientiﬁc ontology of neighboring disciplines—
which partially overlap with sociology in the analysis of certain behavioral
processes—does more harm than good since these disciplines may offer useful
conceptual tools with which to attain the elusive goal of a uniﬁed theory of human
social behavior (Gintis 2007).
7. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS SELF-REFLEXIVITY IN THEORY BUILDING STRATEGIES
One of the main advantages of adopting a new theory or classiﬁcation system
consists precisely of the way that this new way of organizing experience leads to
a “reshufﬂing” of our usual categories allowing us to see things that were previously
thought of as unlike as similar and things that we use to consider alike as radically
different (Hayek 1942). However, this is not the only advantage of adopting a new
conceptual system. The value of the new classiﬁcation should also be gauged by
the way that this new organization of experience synthesizes empirical data in a
new or powerful way (for instance, when it leads to the uniﬁcation of previously
disparate empirical domains) or by the way that it opens up new avenues of
thinking either by way of pointing to new solutions to old problems, by highlightingFormalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge 65
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the existence of problems we did not know existed, or by suggesting that we look
to solutions to existing problems in places where we would not otherwise have
thought of looking.
I am not proposing that looking at contemporary sociological theory from the
vantage point of the formalism/realism problematic does all of these things.
Rather, I think that at this point the biggest advantage of the scheme proposed
here consists of its somewhat unusual (but I think productive) reorganization of
the standard theoretical landscape, so that we are able to observe that no inherent
conﬂict may exist between what many think are irreconcilable positions (such as
structural relationism and certain micro-formalisms such as rational actor theory).
In the same manner, new conﬂicts can now be detected which would otherwise
remain hidden or muddled (e.g. Harrison White’s formalist theory of action and
the search for bio-cognitive microfoundations for social behavior).
For instance, one unintended consequence of holding on to the formalist cognitive
value commitments (Fararo 2000) of internal disciplinary uniﬁcation and internal
ontological autonomy—which the importation and local development of mathe-
matical formalisms aimed at unifying the disciple of sociology (under the banner
of network structuralism for instance) was supposed to further—while also advo-
cating the associated behavioral realist cognitive value commitment to the unity of
the behavioral sciences (Gintis 2007) leads to the appreciation of the limits of formalist
simpliﬁcations and a break with the associated “pragmatic” anti-realism (Friedman
1953; Kanazawa 1998; Whitmeyer 1998) to which the formalist strategy inevitably
leads in favor of a recognition that scientiﬁc development in sociology cannot
proceed in isolation from behavioral-realist concerns. In the present intellectual
context an inherent conﬂict exists between these two sets of cognitive value com-
mitments the resolution of which will do much to further progress in general
sociological theorizing. In this way, intellectual energies can be focused on true
problems and challenges instead of being spent on merely apparent incompatibilities
which dissolve once we adopt the proper stance toward them.
It is important to note that the purpose of the preceding exploration of the issues
is not to stage some over-simplistic “new theoretical war” between formalism and
behavioral realism (or even to suggest that this terms refer to actually existing
“camps” or “theory groups” in sociology today; they certainly do not) but to foster
an appreciation of the importance of the issues raised and a recognition of both
the tensions and the possible avenues of integration across these widely different
ways of building explanatory theory in sociology. This is especially important as we
move farther away from the mid twentieth century disciplinary strictures laid out
by the Parsonian legacy—legislating an ultimately spurious “analytical” autonomy
of sociology from her sister disciplines—and look toward an increasingly post and
transdisciplinary landscape populated by such hybrids as artiﬁcial intelligence,
cognitive linguistics, evolutionary psychology, neuroeconomics, cognitive
anthropology, among a large variety of others. In this sense, the increasingly apt
behavioral-realist penchant for untrammeled interdisciplinary borrowing makes66 Omar Lizardo
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the formalist concern with intradisciplinary purity look more like old relic of the
mid-twentieth century than a sensible twenty-ﬁrst century intellectual strategy.
It may serve as little consolation, but the fact is that this same challenge is now
being faced by our colleagues in all the other “social and behavioral sciences”
(Gintis 2007)—the divisions between which are themselves an artiﬁcial product
of the intellectual strategies mobilized and institutionalized in the 19th century
Euro-American academic ﬁeld (Wallerstein 1995)—especially economics and to a
lesser extent in political science. The rational actor model in these other disciplines
serves as the functional equivalent of the network formalism in sociology: it is
“the” central formal representation of process and structure around which each
discipline is organized, and the metatheoretical systems built around their
supremacy are now beginning to feel the pressure to “conform” and transform
themselves in accordance to what we know from other “lower level” disciplines.
As we have seen, formalist reductionism and other forms of abstract eliminitavism
cannot provide the answer, because they buy disciplinary uniﬁcation at the cost
of sacriﬁcing interdisciplinary coherence (a “tribal” view of science which violates
the postulate of unity) and fostering the development of pragmatic anti-realism, a
conceptual stopgap and purveyor of illusory coherence if there ever was one.
The post-war history of economics should serve as a cautionary tale in this respect
(Blaug 1999; Mirowski 2001). What the above analysis reveals is that theorists
must be careful to not import incompatible meta-theoretical strictures produced by
formalist (i.e. mathematical and logical) commitments into what otherwise appear
to be behavioral realist projects or the result will certainly be conceptual incoherence.
Behavioral realism entails the striving for what E.O. Wilson referred to as
“consilience” (Glimcher and Rustichini 2004) as the unity of all behavioral
sciences (Gintis 2007). This requires that models reﬂect the reality of our bio-
cognitive architecture and the constraints laid-out by ontogenetic development
and phylogenetic inheritance, and that they be compatible with knowledge pro-
cured in other scientiﬁc ﬁelds (Whitmeyer 1998). The move toward qualifying the
expected utility model of the actor in economics is in part driven by the realist (not
“pragmatic” by any means, since this was Samuelson’s defense of the original
rational actor model) that there be no contradictions between neuro-psychological
models and economic models of the social agent (Camerer, Loewenstein, and
Prelec 2004; Gintis 2007; Rabin 2002; Whitmeyer 1998) so that psychology,
economics, biology and sociology can rest on compatible micro-foundations.
The anti-realist pragmatism of the formalists is opposed to the realist drive to
produce models of the human actor and social processes that are compatible with
what is known in other sciences and that incorporate mechanisms and insights
from them. This makes it exceedingly difﬁcult to pursue the goal of transdisciplinary
uniﬁcation, and instead tends to lead to intradisciplinary uniﬁcation around mutually
incompatible (across disciplines) models and ontological commitments, producing
balkanization and a “tower of Babel” effect in the social and behavioral sciences.
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must be subordinate to the realist criterion of producing scientiﬁc models that
have some a relationship of verisimilitude with the underlying structure of the
social and physical worlds (thus a theory can have predictive validity and yet be
“false” from the point of view of the verisimilitude criterion).
By the same token formalisms and formal representations cannot be aban-
doned since they are the primary tool of scientiﬁc progress by way of their ability
to transform our view of reality by transcending pure sense impressions—“denying
the data” by going beyond them in Leifer’s (1992) sense—and the key to the
synthetic and transformative power of scientiﬁc explanations (Hayek 1943).
Accordingly, current theoretical efforts in sociology cannot completely dispense
with formal representations of empirical phenomena. However the formal model
building habitus of most practitioners of mathematical social science—inherited
from applied mathematicians (Weintraub and Mirowski 1994) who care more
about logical possibility than actual possibility (Levine 1993)—should be radically
reconﬁgured in order for any accommodation with the behavioral-realist strategy
to take place. In particular the ease with which the realist cognitive value of
verisimilitude is dismissed as subordinate to parsimony, simplicity, and other
“aesthetic” Pythagorean and instrumentalist values ultimately imported from the
mathematical ﬁeld (Weintraub and Mirowski 1994) will have to be rethought.
The move toward more sophisticated actor models afforded by computer
simulation techniques (Macy and Willer 2002) may provide one avenue of progress
in respect. Further, the role of substrate-independence versus level-speciﬁc processes
of social systems (in many ways an empirical question) will have to be addressed.
Rather than following Simmel’s (1910) strategy of assuming the postulate of
substrate-independence from the beginning. Last but not least, avenues of dialogue
must open between sociology and other social, biological and cognitive sciences
in which the insights of these other disciplines are incorporated into sociological
theorizing while keeping at bay the specter of bottom-up reductionism.
This latter issue is perhaps the most difﬁcult of challenges. Prejudices and
habits of thought bred by decades of disciplinary institutionalization, fears of
imperialist reduction (themselves produced by imperialistic formalist incursions
from other ﬁelds such as the failed attempt by Gary Becker and his students to
generalize the rational actor formalism to all social behavior), mutual misunder-
standing of basic disciplinary traditions, parochial disciplinary hubris, and reser-
vations associated with historical realities that touch on important and sensitive
political and ethical issues stand on the way. However it seems undeniable that
“progress” (cognitive and practical) in sociological theory will become increasingly
tied to whatever success sociologists can garner in the challenge to move beyond
“pure” sociology. The basic cognitive commitment that drives this move should
be the same as the one that moves all of us to produce increasingly powerful
schemes to explain social reality. While “purity” may seem desirable and even
aesthetically pleasing in the abstract, it may not be the best path toward sociology
advancing as an explanatory science of human behavior.68 Omar Lizardo
© 2009 The Author
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009
Omar Lizardo
Department of Sociology
University of Notre Dame
810 Flanner Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA.
olizardo@nd.edu
Acknowledgments. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2004 meeting
of the Paciﬁc Sociological Association in San Francisco, where I beneﬁted from
Rebeca Li’s helpful comments and suggestions. Thomas Fararo, Michel Macy,
and John Levi Martin were kind enough to take their time to comment on
previous drafts of this paper. Last but not least, special thanks go to John Lapeyre
who served as a sometimes very patient partner in various conversations—
especially when it came to what might seemed like my rather naïve questions- all
of which served to clarify some of the ideas presented here, and who also served
as a guidepost into the Physics literature. None of these people however, should
be held in any way responsible for the errors and omissions that may remain.
NOTES
1  It is important to distinguish formalism from the mere use of formal methods, or from
the subjection of empirical data to some sort of data reduction technique that has a
formal-mathematical basis such as regression analysis or correspondence analysis.
Formalism, as I use the term here consists on the added step of postulating that the
intrinsic nature of social (or physical) reality is such that it is isomorphic with, or in fact
demands the particular formal method used because other methods would radically miss the
most crucial aspect of this reality (i.e. relational methods for a relational reality [Berkowitz
1982, 1988; Emirbayer 1997; Wellman 1988], processual methods for a processual reality
[Fararo 1989a] or narrative or sequential methods for a time-bound social world [Abbott
2001b]). Thus, in formalism a substantive ontology (or lack thereof, since formalists tend
to be skeptics of the existence of “entities” and “substances”) precedes and dictates
methodology (and for some formalists alternative methods presume an underlying ontology
[Abbott 1988]), as opposed to the more pragmatic manner with which most social scientists
treat formal methods (e.g. Tilly 2005). In addition, formalism entails the denial of the
existence of certain entities or processes which are then reduced to some more basic
substrate conceived in “formalist” terms.
2  A variety of programmatic statements and expositions of this particular approach have
appeared recently. Some have called for an integration of sociological theorizing with
versions of evolutionary biology (Maryanski 1998) while others have proposed stronger
sociobiological versions that verge on outright reductionism (Ellis 1996); see also Udry (1995)
for a more conciliatory—but radically anti-Durkheimian—take.
3 I borrow the terms “formalism” and “behavioral realism” from an ongoing meta-
theoretical debate in economics between those who think that there general timeless
principles or laws of economic behavior that can be gotten at through formal simplifying
assumptions—“formalists”—versus those who favor the use of biologically and
psychologically realistic models of economic motivation and reject what they consider toFormalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge 69
© 2009 The Author
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009
be naïve and farfetched assumptions usually found in traditional models of the economic
actor in mathematical economics (Boettke 1997, 1998; Rabin 2002).
4 The term “biophysical individual” is meant to differentiate this type of conception of
the individual from the more stylized and abstract conceptualization that formal
methodological individualists utilize such as that found in Coleman (1990). Another way
of thinking about the distinction is to consider it roughly isomorphic to the methodological
versus ontological individualism distinction. By “socioecological setting” I mean environments
that are conceptualized as possessing real world features that constrain social action in
a substantive sense. Formalist theorizing usually sets its social actors in simpliﬁed
“environments” that are exclusively composed of other formalized individuals, as in
standard game-theoretic approaches (e.g. Macy and Skvoretz 1998).
5 In this paper, when speaking of reductionist tendencies in formalist theorizing, I do
not use the term “reduction” in the more familiar but also more restrictive sense of
explaining “higher” level processes by way of showing how there are produced and can be
derived from lower-level constituents. I follow DiTomaso (1982: 14, n. 1) in thinking of
reduction not only in a “spatial” form as connoting “something larger being reduced to
something smaller” but in the more general sense of substituting talk about one sort of
substance or entity (at either a higher or lower level or analysis) for talk about some other
sort of substance or entity (i.e. instead of talking about individuals formalists prefer to talk
about structures, processes and situations). As DiTomaso notes, “The frequent practice of
many sociologists to claim that all social phenomena can be explained by ‘structural
inﬂuences,’ . . . is also a form of reductionism because it arbitrarily eliminates [certain]
aspects of social reality  .  .  .  Whereas psychological reductionism may be charged with
dissolving structure, sociological reductionism may be charged with deﬁning all social
phenomena as part of structure.” Reduction in this sense is closer to “reduction of
ontological complexity” independent of levels.
6 It could be said that as late as a decade ago advocates of a reconsideration of the
relationship between sociology and either biology or cognitive psychology were isolated
voices in the periphery of the sociological discipline. More recently high-proﬁle
mainstream sociologists have produced calls to at least partially integrate—within a non-
reductionist critical framework—insights and processes derived from both cognitive
psychology (Dimaggio 1997) and biology (Massey 2000); with a recent American
Sociological Association presidential address (Massey 2002) and a winner of the ASA best
dissertation award (Freese 2001) dedicated to this latter issue.
7 While the scientiﬁc performance of evolutionary psychological theories in sociology
remains spotty at best (Buller 2005; Freese 2001; Freese, Li, and Wade 2003), the fact that
even critics of the paradigm (e.g. Freese and Powell 1999) are beginning to recommend a
more open ended dialogue between sociology and evolutionary psychology (as opposed to
an outright dismissal), represents a signiﬁcant development in its own right.
8 That Parsons was an avowed formalist, and that his “analytical realism” was a direct
outgrowth of the mathematical formalism of neo-classical economics (especially that
associated with the usage of systems of differential equations) is shown in Camic (1987:
431), and Fararo (1989). Furthermore, as Camic (1987: 435–436) shows, this Parsonian
concern for formalism put Parsons very far away from Weber’s behavioral-realism
(Campbell 1996), a fact that counts more than any other for Parsons selective
appropriation of the Weberian legacy (Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg 1975). Homan’s
opposition to late Parsonian macro-formalist systems-theory and micro-formalist action
theory leads right back to a learning-theoretic micro-formalism. With 20/20 hindsight, we
can consider it ironic that Homans (1964) framed his work as “bringing men [sic] back in”
by relying on operant learning theory, since eliminating “real men” or interacting
biophysical individuals from the picture in favor of some simpliﬁed formal model of their70 Omar Lizardo
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behavior, is precisely one of the most distinctive features of the operant-conditioning
micro-formalism (Hull 1940).
9  It may seem a curious feature of this typology to classify learning theory and expected
utility theory as employing similar theory building strategies. In this respect it is important
to remember that Samuelson’s inﬂuential notion of “revealed preferences”—ﬁrst
formulated in his classic article (1938), which was appropriately titled “a note on the pure
theory of consumer behavior”—was primarily developed in order to do away with nagging
suspicion that preferences and utilities were some sort of (realist) psychological process—
forever unveriﬁable—in a person’s head. This is an idea that goes all the way back to
Bentham, and which has recently been resuscitated in psychology and sociology (Gilbert
and Wilson 2000; Kanazawa 2001). The basic point is that this formulation is in effect a
learning-theoretic micro-formalism: economists do not have to worry about what’s inside
a consumer’s head (her needs, wants or desires), because the very (observable) act of
consumption “reveals” the preference.
10  The ecological formalism (with its attendant concepts of population, competition and
the n-dimensional niche) which, while initially developed for the study of the dynamics of
growth and decline of biotic populations by Hutchinson (1957), has been extended and
generalized in sociology for the study of the dynamics of organizational growth and decline
(Hannan and Freeman 1977), niche-based competition among organizations (Hannan,
Carroll, and Pólos 2003), patterns of joining and leaving organizations (McPherson and
Ranger-Moore 1991) and even cultural dynamics (Mark 1998, 2003). One important
source of confusion when it comes to the formalist version of ecological evolutionary theory
is that it tends to be associated with its behavioral-realist variant. However, human ecology,
as ﬁrst developed in the Chicago School tradition of the study of growth and decline of
cities, and later generalized to the study of human societies in the work of Hawley (1986)
and Duncan, Schnore and Rossi (1959) is not concerned with the abstract (timeless and
spaceless) tool of the n-dimensional niche conceptualized as an abstract space with some
arbitrary metric, but with the actual organization of ﬂows of matter and energy in real
physical socio-ecological settings (Freese 1988), and how “brute” (realist) forces such as
demography and the transformations of space and natural resources via technology and
exploitation of resources by human societies affect these settings (Nolan 1984).
11 Early Blau was an exchange theorist, and he freely mixed behavioral formalist
(learning theory) and behavioral realist components—emotion and attachment processes—
in his formulation. Micro-Turner (Turner 1999, 2000a) is of course a behavioral-realist,
whose work deals with emotion, neurophysiology and cognition. He does keep his alter
egos distinct and separate, denying that there is any need for bridging laws in sociology.
12 It is hard to resist the temptation to examine “pure” sociology from a Durkheimian
sociology of science perspective (Bloor 1982). Thus the ﬁxation with “purity” can be
interpreted as a way to regulate the moral and ontological boundaries of sociology by way
of restricting the circulation of other ontologies and by imposing taboos and restrictions
(e.g. Black 1999; Mayhew, 1980) against the usage of certain concepts especially those that
originate from the threatening “outside” (Douglas 1978). Black (1999) is the best example
(because he is the most candid) in this regard, as he “dreams” of a sociology that is
“. . . entirely uncontaminated by psychology or other sciences” (347, italics added).
13 For a deﬁnitive critique of this style of theorizing in sociology, see Porpora (1989).
14 Behavioral formalists in economics and sociology (e.g. Homans 1950) also abide by a
covering law style of explanation: the difference is that they tend to postulate a set of
interrelated propositions usually ordered by the “level” of the entities being related and
working downwards toward “smaller” and ﬁner grained mechanisms. This is the reason
why Homans’ (1974) late work verged on a “psychological” reductionism, since
propositions at the level of human psychology were for him the lowest level processes wereFormalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge 71
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the chain of logical implications naturally came to a stop. Macro-structural formalists
wedded to the nomothetic model of explanation on the other hand (e.g. Black 1979, 1995;
Blau 1977b; Turner 1995) tend to produce lists of propositions not arranged in a
deductive-hierarchical but in a more horizontal way: that is they all involve entities and
processes located at the same “macro” level of analysis.
15  The obvious analogue to “fundamental entities” in sociology are of course individuals
or some form of starting point rooted in individual experience which leads to the
problematic of individualism in all of its forms (Udehn 2002).
16 This is not a argument against representing individuals through the use of some formal
modeling tool, (i.e. graphs, agent based models, n-person games, etc), but that the processes
that are derived from those formal tools should always be conceived as strictly derivative
from bio-physical individuals, and consequently as formal oversimpliﬁcations thereof.
17 This is a hybrid variant of primarily formalist theorizing that combines a focus on
abstraction and mathematization—usually by way of computer simulation—with the
behavioral-realist concern to provide concrete physiological and cognitive micro-mechanisms
related either to information processing and dynamics of cultural transmission (Macy and
Skvoretz 1998; Mark 2002).
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